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Abstract
This study will look at how school desegregation in Memphis unfolded according
to the phases of desegregation as argued by J. Harvie Wilkinson in From Brown to Bakke
and in relation to the evolution of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Brown’s
meaning. This study will also examine how mob violence was avoided as desegregation
took place in the city. Evidence for this study was gathered from the oral histories of
Judge Robert McRae and Maxine Smith, executive secretary of the Memphis chapter of
the NAACP, newspaper coverage, NAACP records, and John Egerton’s report to the
Southern Regional Council as well as secondary works on school desegregation.
School desegregation in Memphis occurred in three phases: absolute defiance,
token compliance, and massive integration. The Memphis Board of Education as well as
city leaders were committed to fighting desegregation in the courts and avoiding mob
violence in the streets. In the phase of massive integration, busing proved to be the tool
capable of creating a unitary school system. Opposition to busing caused over thirty
thousand students to flee the public school system creating an African American majority
school system. The Court’s retreat from strong support of school desegregation and
white flight counteracted the successes made toward creating an integrated school system
in Memphis. In the end, Memphis failed to create an integrated school system.
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Introduction
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that
segregation in public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of African
American students and was therefore unconstitutional. The impact of this decision
ignited one of the most controversial issues of the Civil Rights Movement. School
desegregation was an issue that touched almost every corner of the country and has
proved to have lasting implications for our nation’s educational system. Although the
Supreme Court set the general course for school desegregation in their various decisions,
desegregation played out differently in every community. From violent mobs to peaceful
compliance, public reactions varied across the nation and influenced the course of
desegregation in each community.
In Brown to Bakke, J. Harvie Wilkinson argues that desegregation in the South
occurred in four stages: absolute defiance, token compliance, modest integration, and
massive integration. 1 Each of these periods corresponds with federal action on the issue
primarily through the Supreme Court and its decisions. The period of absolute defiance
began immediately after the Brown decision and ended with the fall of the larger white
resistance movements. The stages of token compliance and modest integration stretched
from 1960 to 1968. Modest integration applied only to the areas under the supervision of
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. This department oversaw school
desegregation in areas not under a court-ordered plan. Finally, massive integration began
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in 1968 with the Greene v. New Kent County School Board decision and concluded with
court-ordered busing.
This study will examine how school desegregation played out in Memphis
according to Wilkinson’s phases and in relation to the evolution of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Brown’s meaning. Memphis experienced absolute defiance, token
compliance, and massive integration. Because of litigation occurring during the phase of
modest integration, Memphis did not fall under the supervision of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare and thus did not experience this phase. As desegregation
unfolded in each of these phases, the major problems and pitfalls of the major Supreme
Court’s decisions were demonstrated. The Memphis story also demonstrates how a
deeply segregated Southern city handled the profound social changes that Brown
mandated.
While Memphis fits into the broad pattern of desegregation, it did not experience
the problems of violence that many communities endured during this struggle.
Opposition to school desegregation ran strong in the white community, yet those opposed
did not resort to mob violence as a tool to fight the implementation of the various court
rulings. How did Memphis avoid the violence that cities such as Little Rock
experienced? By examining the actions and rhetoric of city officials especially in the
early phase, a pattern of calming the people while maintaining their support for
segregation emerges. Even as the city faced controversial busing orders, the leaders used
politics and legal maneuvers to thwart desegregation instead of inciting the public to take
violent actions to maintain segregation. Although committed to fighting desegregation,

2

Memphis city leaders opposed the use of violence and instead took their fight to the
federal courtrooms where they could fight desegregation through legal means.
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Chapter One:
Absolute Defiance (1954-1960)
By striking down the doctrine of “separate but equal” that had been established in
1896 by Plessy v. Ferguson, Brown was seen as the beginning of the end for segregation.
Brown would go no further than this simple pronouncement, however, because it left
implementation up to a later time. The Court cited various local conditions that needed to
be considered before a plan for desegregation could be formulated. The Court went as far
as to invite affected states to submit briefs to help formulate plans for implementation.
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the brief eleven-page decision. From the
beginning, the Court understood that its decision would have a profound impact on
American society. The impact of this decision on the South and the anticipated
resistances prompted the short decision. The other key reason was the need for a
unanimous decision. With such a controversial topic, a unanimous decision carried more
weight than a decision reached by a divided Court. “To speak with one voice was to
speak with force and finality; to speak otherwise was but to lend comfort to an enemy
already in prey,” J. Harvie Wilkinson III argues. 2 The South and all those supportive of
segregation latched onto anything in their fight to retain their racially divided society.
Many Southern politicians noted that they were surprised if not shocked by the
unanimous decision. The unanimity of Brown stressed to those opposing factions that the
Constitution and the Supreme Court would no longer uphold segregation.
As news of the decision hit the presses across the country, response in the South
varied from outright opposition to a calmer wait-and-see approach. Memphis was caught
2
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in the middle of these two responses. Located at Tennessee’s borders with Mississippi
and Arkansas, Memphis has strong Deep South connections. The city is also the home of
a large African American population. Because of the combination of these factors, the
city was presented with a decision. Would city leaders follow the lead of Tennessee state
officials who advocated a calm and cautious approach or their Deep South neighbors who
declared their outright opposition to any attempts to desegregate public schools?
The response of Memphians can best be described as a compromise of these two
stances. Milton Bowers Sr., president of the Memphis Board of Education, remarked that
“we have been expecting this to happen a long while, but at the same time, we’ve made
no plans because we feel none will be needed.” 3 Bowers argued that black schools were
located in black neighborhoods and he believed that everyone would continue using their
own schools because of the convenience of location. 4 He also claimed black schools
were “fully equal to and in some instances better” than white schools. When asked if he
believed white schools would ever be opened up to black students, Bowers replied that he
“did not believe such would ever be the case here.” 5 The response by Bowers does not
imply support for Brown nor does it even acknowledge the existence of a segregated
school system in the city. In order to subvert the decision while also assuring white
citizens that they had no intentions of changing the school system, city officials adopted a
plan that denied any misconduct.
Both the Commercial Appeal and Press-Scimitar advised Memphians to remain
calm while asking for time from the federal government to deal with this issue. The
3
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Appeal told its readers that this was no time for extremist sentiment. 6 The Appeal ended
its editorial with this statement: “The main thing is for the American people to face this
squarely as an accomplished fact, and work out our destiny for the general good and the
greater glory of our nation.” 7 The editorial cartoon for that day also addressed this issue.
A Supreme Court justice, representing the entire Court, was pictured pushing the head of
a horse, representing non-segregation, into a water trough.8 The title of the cartoon
“Relax! He’ll Drink When He’s Ready” is an excellent example of this plea for time and
patience in the implementation of desegregation. The Press-Scimitar echoed the
sentiments of the Appeal, telling its readers that the decision would have to be accepted. 9
Despite the reassurances of city officials and the advice of city newspaper
editorials, Memphians still had plenty to say in opposition of Brown. In the Sunday
paper following the Brown decision, the Letters to the Editor echoed widespread
opposition throughout the region. M.Y. Peel of Paris, Tennessee, pointed to the hard
work and money given to black citizens by Southern white people and claimed that black
citizens should appreciate what had been given them. 10 Peel alleged that communist
influence contributed to the NAACP’s success in the Brown case. “The Communist
propaganda machine, working through the United Nations and the World Council of
Churches has immeasurably helped in this project, for no nation has long remained

6

“A Decision Expected,” Commercial Appeal, 18 May 1954, 6.
Ibid.
8
“Relax! He’ll Drink When He’s Ready,” Editorial Cartoon, Commercial Appeal, 18 May 1954, 6.
9
Hugh Davis Graham, Crisis in Print: Desegregation and the Press in Tennessee, (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1967), 41.
10
M.Y. Peel, “Decision Called Blow at Liberty: Governors Called on to Protect Citizens,” Letter to the
Editor, Commercial Appeal, 23 May 1954, Sec. V, p. 3.
7

6

powerful where mixed races exist,” Peel argued. 11 Individuals opposed to desegregation
often alleged Communist influence in their criticism of both Brown and the NAACP.
This letter was typical of the anti-Communist rhetoric used by individual’s opposed to
Memphis desegregation.
A year later the Supreme Court issued its implementation order. It ruled in Brown
II that no definite date would be set for school desegregation. Instead desegregation was
to take place with “all deliberate speed.” Wilkinson argues that Brown II only served to
encourage Southern resistance: “The Court thrice suggested that varied local problems
and obstacles might require a varied pace of school desegregation, an encouragement to
volatile racial feelings in rural, black belt communities in every southern state.” 12 The
South received almost exactly what they wanted out of Brown II. The only deadline they
had been given was infinity. Another victory for the South in Brown II was the identity
of those in charge of implementing desegregation. Primary responsibility lay with local
school boards under the supervision of local federal district courts. This meant that those
individuals opposed to school desegregation were the very ones given the job of
formulating plans for Brown’s implementation. The Supreme Court had issued its decree
and left the rest up to the South.
In the years following Brown, Memphians and Tennesseans in general watched
anxiously as the state government vacillated between taking steps to desegregate or to
impede the process. Governor Frank Clement spoke out for moderation on this issue and
vetoed pro-segregationist legislation. Pro-segregationists, however, had several ways in

11
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which they could argue for defensive state legislation. Clinton, a small community in
East Tennessee, experienced an outbreak of violence when five African American
students attempted to desegregate the public high school in September 1956. Following
that, the supreme court of Tennessee declared unconstitutional the provision in the state
constitution calling for racially segregated schools.
White resistance to desegregation took other forms as well. In Crisis in Print,
Hugh Davis Graham cites newspapers coverage of rioting in Tennessee, Kentucky, and
Texas; a report by the Southern Education Reporting Service stating that integration had
begun in border states which heightened anxieties and resistance in the Deep South; and
the state supreme court’s ruling against segregation as several key examples of news
items used to incite pro-segregationist sentiment. 13 The best weapon in the arsenal of
pro-segregationists was a hearing inspired by a few powerful southern congressmen. The
hearing examined the impact of integration on District of Columbia schools. William
Gerber of Memphis served as counsel for this committee. Pro-segregationists claimed
that the hearings had “‘exposed evidence of delinquency, sex irregularities, increasing
discipline problems, and shocking reverses in academic standards since integration was
made the rule within the District of Columbia.’” 14 The New York Times correspondent
for the hearings noted in his coverage that “the phrasing of the questions seemed to be
keyed to develop the view that desegregation had lowered scholastic records and
increased disciplinary and sex problems.” 15 By speaking to some of the greatest fears of
the white community, the alleged findings of the committee along with the other issues
13

Hugh Davis Graham, Crisis in Print, 115-116.
Ibid. 116.
15
“Integration Setbacks,” New York Times, 23 September 1956, 186.
14

8

used by pro-segregationists served as attempts to unite Southerners against desegregation
and inspire state legislatures to pass laws in defense of segregation.
In 1957, Governor Frank Clement signed five ambiguous bills dealing with school
desegregation. Each of these bills allowed for school boards to desegregate at their own
pace while maintaining as much segregation as possible. The Tennessee Pupil Placement
Act gave school boards full power to assign students to their respective schools as long as
those assignments were not based solely on race. If a student disagreed with his or her
assignment, the student could appeal to the board, but the process for appeal was long
and complicated. The law worked under the assumption that most schools would be
racially segregated while a limited number would be integrated. Furthermore, the law
placed the burden of desegregation on African American students. A student had to
submit an application to the board in order to be considered for a transfer. In the best
case scenario, the Pupil Placement Act would allow for only token desegregation.
Intimidation and fear of retribution prevented most African Americans from using the
Pupil Placement Act to desegregate public schools.
The Memphis School Board began taking steps to ensure the continued
segregation of public schools. The Memphis School Board, like other school boards
across the South, began taking steps to equalize segregated schools instead of preparing
plans to desegregate them. In 1955, the board initiated plans to build Lester High School.
Lester School was built less than a mile from East High School, a white school, and was
constructed in a heavily black neighborhood. In Judge Robert McRae’s oral history
account, he stated that the building of this school was an attempt by the board to continue

9

separate schools for the races. 16 The building of Lester School especially so close to one
of the most desired white schools was the school board’s attempt to placate African
Americans and to keep them from pushing for desegregation. The school board would
not have to wait long, however, to face its first challenges by black students pushing for
admittance to white schools.
On August 4, 1958, Gerald Young, an eight-year-old African American, was
denied admittance to Vollentine Elementary School, a white school. Mrs. George
McFerren, Young’s mother, wanted to enroll her son at Vollentine because it was closer
to their home than the school her son had attended previously. The reason for the denial
of admittance as stated in the Commercial Appeal was previous enrollment of the student
at Hyde Elementary. 17 The Press Scimitar reported that McFerren had registered her son
under protest at Hyde Park following the application at Vollentine but before going to the
school board to request her son’s admittance to Vollentine. 18 The same story also stated
that McFerren was not given a reason for the denial yet the Appeal cited previous
enrollment as well as no consideration for convenience of location as the reasons for the
denial. The school board cited no consideration for convenience of location to maintain
their gerrymandered attendance zones. Both articles pointed out that McFerren had lived
in Memphis as a child but had only moved back to the city four years earlier. The Appeal
ended its article with a statement from the school superintendent E.C. Stimbert: “No
Negro has attempted to enroll in the white schools of Memphis for at least the 12 years I

16
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have been here.” 19 This statement following the information about the residence of
McFerren implied that local African Americans were not pushing for desegregation and
therefore must be satisfied with the school system as it was. This implication goes along
with the statements made by the board following the Brown decision. The Memphis
Board of Education was firm in its defense of segregation and the assertion that the
African American community was happy with their schools.
In December 1959, a little over a year after Gerald Young was denied admittance
to Vollentine, the African American community under the leadership of the local chapter
of the NAACP sent a letter to the school board asking them to begin desegregating the
public school system. On February 8, 1960, in a crowded school board meeting,
attorneys H.T Lockard, A.W. Willis, and R.B. Sugarmon Jr. along with Dr. Vasco Smith
Jr., a dentist, and Jesse Turner, a bank official, posed the question of whether the school
board believed that Memphis schools were segregated and if so when the school board
intended to end this practice. All of these men were members of the local NAACP. The
board had previously refused to have any dealings with the NAACP on the grounds that
the organization represented a private interest group. 20 Walter Armstrong Jr., board
president, responded to the questions posed by saying that the board intended to comply
with the laws of the state. 21 A white attorney, Brooks Norfleet, also in attendance as a
concerned citizen, asserted that many school taxpayers were opposed to desegregation

19
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and that, should the NAACP push the issue, “there would be a long day ahead.” 22 The
dawn of that long day was just around the corner.
On March 31, 1960, the NAACP sued in federal court for the immediate
desegregation of Memphis public schools. The suit asked the defendants to present a
plan for complete desegregation under a time frame designated by the court. Thurgood
Marshall and Constance Baker Motley, working for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
were among the eight attorneys who filed suit on behalf of the eighteen minors and their
parents listed as plaintiffs. Marshall and Motley were two of the NAACP’s top attorneys
in the quest for school desegregation, and both had worked on the Brown case. Mayor
Henry Loeb responded to the suit by expressing his support for the school board and
declaring that “we have bent over backwards in providing equal facilities and I further
hope that all responsible people will stop, think, and consider.” 23 Memphis city officials
responded to the suit by taking a firm stand in support of the status quo. They had no
intention of reorganizing the school system in compliance with Brown and pledged to use
every legal means possible to maintain their position. 24 It was indeed going to be a long
day in the fight over desegregation in Memphis.
In an editorial on April 1, 1960, the Commercial Appeal spoke to both the white
and black communities about the impending lawsuit. To the white community, the article
spoke of the inevitability of desegregation. It was going to happen, and the news of the
lawsuit should not be taken as a surprising development. Those opposed needed to realize
that whether they liked it or not the wheels had been set in motion years before. In
22
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speaking to the black community, the many supposed gains of the African American
community were listed in an attempt to urge patience in this new battle over equal rights.
Furthermore, the black community was told they must earn equal rights. “Moreover, at
the risk of repeating a platitude, we recall that the blessings of freedom never fell, as
pennies from heaven, into the lap of any people until those people had demonstrated both
the ability and the will to cherish and honor rights and privileges,” the editorial argued. 25
This statement demonstrated the attitude and rhetoric of many white southerners. They
believed that African Americans had not earned the right to have the same rights as they
did. Whites also argued that blacks should be happy with their place in society compared
with other oppressed people around the world in places such as Russia and India. Of
course, whites did not extend this comparison by examining the similarities between
themselves and other oppressive power structures.
On the same day that the NAACP sued the Memphis School Board, the Appeal
reported on the White House Conference on Children and Youth. The speakers at this
national conference spoke of the eventual end to racial segregation and the effect this
would have on the future of America’s youth. The article included a quote from a
marriage counselor who had addressed those attending the conference. “Racial
integration, whatever anyone says to the contrary, will lead inevitably to intermarriage,”
the counselor declared. 26 This statement spoke to the number one fear of many white
Southerners. They did not want to see their children married to blacks. This violated
every principle of white supremacy and was one of the largest factors motivating
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opposition against the desegregation of public schools. These statements, reported on the
same day suit was filed against the Memphis School Board, served only to heighten white
opposition and fear of what was to come.

14

Chapter Two:
Token Compliance (1961-1967)
Identified as Northcross v. The Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools,
the Memphis case was heard in the United States District Court of the Western District of
Tennessee beginning in late March 1961 with Judge Marion Boyd presiding over the
case. On April 14, 1961, Boyd issued his first ruling in favor of the Memphis City
School Board. The ruling upheld the Tennessee Pupil Placement Act as an adequate plan
for desegregation. Citing the failure of the plaintiffs to exhaust completely the provisions
of the Pupil Placement Act, Boyd praised the school board’s goodwill on dealing with
this issue. Boyd ended his ruling by asserting that “the Court hopes very much that all
concerned will now cooperate to the end that the provisions of the Tennessee Pupil
Placement Act will be observed in Memphis, and that we can go forward with the
education of our children without discrimination.” 27 Boyd’s decision ignored the basic
fact that in the seven years since the Brown decision had been handed down not one
classroom in Memphis had been desegregated. The school board continued to operate a
completely segregated school system.
The NAACP responded to Judge Boyd’s ruling by walking out of court in protest.
Judge Robert McRae briefly addressed the reaction of the plaintiffs in his oral history. “It
is doubtful that the Negroes who came to listen to justice dispensed heard the end of the
judge’s ruling because The Memphis World newspaper carried a front page article
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pointing out that the Negroes walked out during Boyd’s ruling,” he recalled. 28 Maxine
Smith, executive secretary for the Memphis branch of the NAACP, recalled her
frustration with the judge’s ruling. She remembered wondering how Boyd had declared
schools desegregated when “it just happened that all the children are black children with
one set of schools and all black teachers taught in that set of schools.”29
One of the weaknesses of Brown II was at work here. The Supreme Court had
left the implementation of its decision in the hands of those opposed to the Court’s
decision. Judge Boyd had been given complete control over the local school cases as
decreed by Brown II. According to Judge McRae’s observations and contact with Boyd,
he believed that Boyd did not believe in the equality of the races nor did Boyd support
desegregation. 30 It was no surprise that Boyd ruled in favor of the Memphis School
Board. The school board had won the first battle in retaining their segregated school
system, but this victory would be short lived as the plaintiffs appealed Boyd’s ruling.
To test the good faith of the school board in using the Pupil Placement Act to
begin desegregation, the NAACP searched for any parent willing to let their children be
the first to desegregate Memphis schools in the fall of 1961. Finding parents who were
willing to put their children in that position was not easy for the NAACP. Memories of
the violent scenes at Central High School in Little Rock in 1957 were still vivid in the
minds of most African Americans. Those first children were warriors in the battle to
desegregate, and no one could guarantee how the white community would react when
black children entered white schools for the first time. Maxine Smith was one of the
28
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NAACP members who searched for parents willing to put their children on the frontlines.
In their search, she and other NAACP members visited over two hundred homes. 31 The
fear of white violence deterred many black families from attempting to send their
children to integrate the schools. The NAACP was successful, however, in finding
approximately fifty willing candidates. Those parents then applied under the guidelines
of the Pupil Placement Act to have their children sent to white schools.
The school board had to begin at least token desegregation in order to convince
the federal court officials that they were acting in good faith. Out of the fifty applicants,
thirteen African American children were selected to enter first grade in white schools.
News of the board’s plan to desegregate was not released to the public until the morning
that the black students began classes at Bruce, Gordon, Rozelle, and Springdale Schools.
The delay in releasing news to the public was part of the city’s plan to help prevent any
violent outbreaks. Without prior knowledge, mobs of protestors could not gather at the
schools. Also, Memphis police were posted at each of the schools to prevent any
outbreaks of violence. The steps taken by the city facilitated the peaceful desegregation
of the four schools on the morning of October 3, 1961.
City officials were committed to preventing any outbreaks of mob violence. In
addressing the approximately two hundred policemen assigned to schools, police
commissioner Claude Armour gave very specific instructions. He ordered that no
congregating be allowed near the schools and that two detectives would be placed inside
each of the schools giving frequent reports to police outside. 32 Maxine Smith recalled
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that the Chief of Police was firm in his stance that violence would not be allowed. “The
Memphis Chief of Police was racist to the core, but he believed in following the law,” she
said. 33 Although his beliefs conflicted with what he was protecting, Armour was
committed to doing his job. Also, the Memphis Chamber of Commerce issued a
statement on the day that schools were to be desegregated aimed at appealing to citizens
for support. Chamber president Edward LeMaster declared that “all legal means have
been fully explored and answered. There is no alternative to the action that is being
taken.” 34 The rhetoric and actions of city officials illustrated their commitment to
avoiding the fate of cities like Little Rock that had been overrun with mob violence when
desegregation began. They did not like what was happening, but they were determined to
fight it only by legal means. City leaders did not want to see racial violence in Memphis
in the national media. They needed to protect the city and the city’s image.
The children who bravely desegregated Memphis city schools that year faced
school administrators, teachers, and fellow classmates who did not want them in their
schools. They faced harassment on a daily basis. As vanguards in the early struggle to
desegregate public schools, these students were exposed to the harsh realities of racism.
Michael Willis, one of the three black students assigned to Bruce Elementary, recalled
some of his experiences in an interview in 2004. "I didn't really understand what was
going on," said Michael Willis, who has since changed his name to Fombi. "I remember
thinking, Why are they doing this? and Why me? The fact that my father was a lawyer
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and seen as partly responsible for this made me a more visible target."35 He also recalled
“being called nigger, pushed down steps, and mocked with cries of ‘you can't wash the
brown off’ when I went to the restroom. My teacher was mean, and the few students who
befriended me were likely to turn on me suddenly.” 36 Because of the harsh treatment he
faced on a daily basis, Willis soon transferred back to his old school.
On the surface, Memphis seemed to have embarked on the road to desegregation
rather smoothly, or at least in the eyes of the school board it had. On March 23, 1962, the
United States Sixth Court of Appeals reversed Judge Boyd’s previous ruling. The court’s
ruling found Boyd’s decision to be “contrary to the evidence and clearly erroneous.” 37
The Pupil Placement Act was declared unfit as a plan for desegregation. The court ruled
that the burden of desegregation rested with school authorities, not African American
students. Also, the court declared that Memphis was operating a dual school system.
The opinion noted the statistics for the Memphis School System at the time of Boyd’s
ruling as evidence of a segregated school system. As of April 14, 1961, the school
system served “100,000 pupils, 44% of whom were Negroes in 44 all black schools. The
56% White pupils were in 79 all white schools.” 38 This court ruling firmly upheld the
Brown decision.
The school board responded with shocked expressions to the court’s ruling.
When asked how the board would respond to the ruling, School President W.D.
Galbreath answered “well, I don’t know. The Court doesn’t seem to have said what we
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should do.” 39 In the board’s response to this ruling, another problem of the Brown
decisions was demonstrated. Neither of the Supreme Court’s rulings had given
guidelines that school officials could use to help solve this problem. The principles of
Brown would not be overturned, and the South was left to figure out how to alter their
educational system to comply. The Memphis School Board now had to go back and
formulate a realistic plan for desegregation.
The board adopted a plan that went into effect starting in the 1962-1963 school
year. At the beginning of that school year, second and third grades were desegregated
along with the continued desegregation of the first grade. The new plan provided for the
desegregation of an additional grade each year until all twelve grades were
desegregated. 40 The ending date for this plan was 1971. In May 1963, the board and the
NAACP found themselves before Judge Boyd again. This time the board’s new plan
would be the subject of debate. The NAACP argued that ten years was too long a time
frame for school desegregation. The NAACP proposed a plan that would have
desegregation completed in a three year period. However, Boyd upheld the grade-a-year
plan. The vagueness of Brown II’s “all deliberate speed” was still proving to be a
problem as the process of appeals began once again. The NAACP appealed Boyd’s
ruling, and the case moved back into the court of appeals.
On June 15, 1964, the U.S. Sixth Court of Appeals once again overruled Boyd’s
decision. The school board was ordered to desegregate junior high schools in September
1965 and senior highs by 1966. The appeal also addressed the gerrymandering of school
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zones, pupil transfer, and faculty desegregation. In defending their school zones, the
board reasoned that the current zones were drawn “to disturb the people as little as
possible.” 41 The court ruled that this was not a proper factor in determining school zones
and remanded the issue back to the district courts. The next issue the court addressed
was a clause in the board’s plan concerning pupil transfers. This clause allowed for the
open transfer of students to a predominately white or black school when the student was
currently enrolled at a school affected by desegregation. The board cited the 1963 Goss
v. Knoxville School Board opinion to support this clause. The court ruled, however, that
Memphis was not following the decision because the transfers were based solely on race.
The clause would allow for the continuation of segregation and was therefore illegal.
The desegregation of faculty was put off until a later date though the court did note its
recent opinion in a Chattanooga pupil case that “ruled that the assignment of teachers by
race may impair the students’ right to an education free from any consideration of
race.” 42
The school board went back to work rezoning schools to comply with the court’s
ruling. School boundaries had been drawn to ensure the maximum amount of
segregation. This included overlapping zones that kept black students in black schools.
Now the board was faced with the challenge of creating a unitary set of boundaries. The
board remained firm in its stance to allow only limited desegregation, however, as
districts still existed that were composed of only one race. By January 1965, twenty of
the city’s eighty-three elementary schools were integrated, and thirteen of the thirty-five
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junior high schools were integrated. 43 Also, a lenient transfer policy was adopted.
Students could apply for transfer for a variety reasons as long as race was not mentioned.
The board cited convenience of location as a valid reason for transfer. 44 Previously, the
board had denied that convenience could be used as a reason for transfers when Gerald
Young was denied admittance to a white school in 1958. The board had made its ruling
then in order to preserve segregation. Now, the board relied on such reasons as a way to
avoid complete desegregation. White parents could move their children out of schools
that were integrated based solely on reasons of convenience. The board remained
committed to preserving segregation as much as they possibly could.
On May 13, 1966, the NAACP issued a complaint to Judge Boyd asking him to
reject the proposed school boundaries. The NAACP charged that these new boundaries
were gerrymandered and in violation of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 1964 ruling.
An order was issued on July 29, 1966, that divided the school system into separate
geographic zones. Pupils would attend schools in the zones where they lived and free
transfers would be permitted. After this order, Boyd retired and Judge Robert McRae
took his place on November 10, 1966. McRae cited two reasons for Boyd’s sudden
retirement. One was the reversal of each of his decisions in the Northcross case. Also,
McRae believed that Judge Boyd “felt he had to leave rather than to enforce the
Constitution in a manner that was foreign to his beliefs.” 45 The other reason was a failed
opportunity to be appointed to the court of appeals. With a new judge presiding over the
case, the Northcross case moved into a new phase. This new phase would see major
43
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changes enacted and the effects of these changes would have widespread consequences
on the make-up of the city.
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Chapter Three:
Massive Integration (1968-1974)
By the mid-sixties, federal courts were moving towards more specific decrees in
school cases. The fallback positions of Southern school boards were time and time again
tested in federal courts. As each one from pupil placement to freedom of choice was
tested in court, it became clear that the courts were moving from token desegregation to
massive integration. Integration would prove to be more controversial as it aimed to
erase all remnants of segregation. This move became clear once freedom of choice plans
were challenged in the court system. Freedom of choice was widely supported in the
South. It allowed for a parent to choose what school their child would attend and proved
an effective way to avoid desegregated schools. Wilkinson discusses the obvious
drawbacks of freedom of choice. He argues that in theory this plan might have allowed
for some degree of desegregation, but in practice, only the opposite was true. 46 White
children did not choose to go to black schools, and because of fear of retaliation, few
blacks would choose to go to white schools. White employers and school boards made it
clear to the black community that if they pushed for integration there would be negative
consequences. Those supportive of freedom of choice and the limited amount of
desegregation that this plan allowed argued that Brown had never intended for massive
integration.
In the spring of 1968, the Supreme Court settled this debate in Green v. New Kent
County School Board and Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of Jackson, Tennessee.
Lower level federal courts had been chipping away at freedom of choice, but the Court’s
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ruling in these cases would be the final blow in the debate. The Green decision stated
that the only purpose of freedom of choice “was to preserve some semblance of the old
segregation.” 47 Monroe applied the same principles of Green to systems that had
adopted freedom of transfer plans. Green not only struck down freedom of choice, but it
emphasized reliance on statistical evidence, actual results, and it reaffirmed that school
boards were responsible for desegregating schools not black students. In these decisions,
the Supreme Court reinforced what the lower courts and the Health, Education, and
Welfare Department had been working towards. Token desegregation would no longer
be the final goal. Massive integration was now the goal.
Memphis had been working under a freedom of transfer plan. The NAACP filed
a motion of further relief as a result of the Green and Monroe decisions. They sought to
have all transfers cancelled, additional faculty desegregation, and a report setting forth
modifications to the July 29, 1966 desegregation plan. 48 After a three-day hearing,
McRae ruled on May 15, 1969, that the transfer policy did not have a major effect on the
continued segregation of students because of segregated housing patterns in the city. 49
He did give majority to minority transfers priority in the ruling. Students who were of
the majority race in a school could easily transfer to a school in which they would be part
of the racial minority. This type of transfer accelerated the rate of integration. Also, the
ruling called for the board to file maps and revised boundary lines along with racial
statistics for the school system. The board was required to appoint a full-time Director of
Desegregation and to continue working on faculty desegregation with a system-wide goal
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of twenty percent of teachers assigned to racial minority positions by 1969-70. One of
the most interesting developments in the ruling was the first mention of busing. Neither
the NAACP nor the board had mentioned busing, but the court included a comment in its
ruling that busing would be a way to further desegregation efforts in the city. 50 Judge
McRae recognized that segregated housing in the city that had been designed to segregate
schools and communities made busing the city’s best option to achieve an integrated
school system. The NAACP was not satisfied with the ruling and immediately appealed.
In the meantime, in October 1969, another major issue that the NAACP had been
fighting for came to a head. Since the early 1960s, the NAACP had been making
requests to the school board to have an African American appointed to the school board.
With each vacancy that came open, a request was placed by the NAACP and dismissed
by the school board. As the pattern continued, Maxine Smith said that the requests of the
NAACP came to be demands, which prompted the onset of the Black Monday protests. 51
On October 9, approximately 25,000 black students either walked out of class or did not
attend in what the NAACP called a “spontaneous demonstration.” 52 The school board
was scheduled to meet with the NAACP to discuss some of their demands at a public
meeting on October 10. After the student walkout, the board cancelled their meeting with
the NAACP. The cancellation prompted 45,000 students to stay out of school in protest
on October 10. When the school board used armed police to bar attendance to the open
meeting, the NAACP began preparations to have a massive boycott of black students and
teachers from city schools starting on October 13. The purpose of a student boycott was
50
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“to pull at the purse strings” of the school board. 53 School funding was based on average
daily attendance. By having massive numbers of students absent, the city would receive
far less funding and would be more willing to listen to the demands of the NAACP.
The first Black Monday protest saw 63,000 students and 500 teachers absent from
school. Many of those participating in the boycott picketed the board of education
throughout the day. This first protest prompted a meeting between the NAACP and
board two days later. At this meeting, the NAACP issued fifteen demands. These
demands included the pairing of schools so that white students would be sent to all-black
schools and vice versa, the inclusion of African Americans in administrative positions,
more black teachers hired, courses and textbooks that include African American history,
all school board meetings be open and televised, and a program for free lunches be
provided by the school board. 54 The board denied action on each of the demands. This
response prompted the NAACP to walk out of the meeting. Reverend Ezekiel Bell,
NAACP president, described the board’s responses to the NAACP demands as “vague,
negative, utterly ridiculous and an insult to the intelligence of anyone concerned with
education.” 55 As the protest escalated and negotiations between the city and the Black
Coalition stalled, Gordon Hanna, editor of the Commercial Appeal, pleaded with both
sides for “patient exploration of matters” in order to prevent another crisis from arising in
the city. 56
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The next Black Monday protest on October 20 would see 67,000 students and
674 teachers taking part. The agenda of the protest expanded to cover not only the
educational issues but also the union struggle at St. Joseph’s Hospital and police
brutality. A coalition was formed that included the NAACP, the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Committee on the Move for Equality, Shelby
County Democratic Club, Bluff City Council of Civic Clubs, Concerned Teachers,
Welfare Rights Organization, Memphis Mobilizers, and ministerial alliances. 57 The
purpose of the coalition was to place economic pressure on the city government by
organizing marches, picketing, and selective buying campaigns. The board responded to
this second protest by threatening to fire any teacher who was absent because of
participation in the protest. 58 They also reported that steps were being taken to enforce
truancy laws, which could lead to the arrest of parents and suspension of absent students.
The NAACP responded to the board’s threat by warning school officials, especially black
principals, not to take action against students and teachers absent because of participation
in the Black Monday protest. Reverend Bell warned that “if any black principal is
suspected of threatening anyone absent, then he will be visited by us and the wrath of the
black community will be brought down upon him.” 59
On October 22, representatives for the board and the NAACP met for a televised
debate of the NAACP’s demands. Edgar Bailey, board president, suggested that the
board would consider appointing black advisers to the board. Reverend Bell replied that
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such appointments “could only be considered on a temporary basis while legislation to
change the school board structure is considered.” 60 In the meantime, the NAACP
promised that demonstrations would escalate until their demands were met. Maxine
Smith said that “the NAACP felt it had no choice except to use the tactics of
demonstrations and boycott in the struggle because of its distrust of the school board.” 61
Two days later, the school board agreed to appoint a biracial advisory committee by
December 1. The NAACP responded that they were pleased with the decision but would
not call off the demonstrations until all their demands were discussed.
On October 27, the third straight Black Monday protest took place with 45,000
students absent from school. A series of three secret negotiations sessions were held
between the NAACP and the school board in an effort to work out the dispute and end
the demonstrations. At the same time, the City Council began working to pass an
ordinance that would regulate marches and parades in an effort to halt the success of the
Black Monday protests. Calmer voices in the council pointed out that such a move would
build support for the Black Coalition. Since secret negotiations seemed no closer to
ending the dispute, the Commercial Appeal editors and civic leaders pleaded with the
school board to enter into third-party mediation with the NAACP to resolve the dispute.
A mediation committee consisting of white and black civic leaders was set up to help
negotiations in the dispute.
As the fourth Black Monday approached, secret negotiations were still producing
no resolutions to end the dispute. A work stoppage was called for in order to gain
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additional support for the protest. On November 3, a total of 1,995 city employees
walked off their jobs to join the protest. In addition, all black insurance companies and
several other black businesses closed to join the protest. Approximately 68,000 students,
561 teachers, and 900 cafeteria workers participated in the protest. The widespread
support of the fourth Black Monday protest prompted the school board and the city to
seek an injunction against “those responsible for student boycotts, picketing, and
absenteeism of pupils, teachers, and other employees.” 62 In response, the Black
Coalition threatened a continuous boycott if such an injunction was served.
On November 11, the fifth Black Monday met with police resistance as the
marchers were told they would not be able to march, but a meeting between the Black
Coalition and the police worked out an arrangement in which a march to City Hall could
be held. A total of 20,176 students and 135 teachers stayed out of school in support of
the protest. As tensions mounted in the city, the effect spilled over into the black schools
on November 13 when disruptions forced twenty-two schools to close. Principals at the
schools blamed the disruptions on “pickets, demonstrators, and parents worried about
their children.” 63 Black Coalition members went to the schools in an effort to help
restore order to the schools. Jesse Epps, union leader and member of the Black Coalition,
explained that “we have asked them (the students) to be cool. We are trying to find out
who’s in charge and get them (students) off the streets as quickly as possible.” 64
In response, the NAACP issued a statement urging parents to send their children
back to school, and they called for a ten-day cooling off period. Maxine Smith said the
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ten-day suspension “was designed to determine if our school board had good faith. It was
a test of their honesty.” 65 Smith also said that the suspension of the school boycott was
prompted by concern for the safety of the black students. The ten-day suspension proved
to be a controversial decision as the NAACP leadership split over the decision. Approval
of the ten-day suspension resulted in the resignation of Reverend Ezekiel Bell as NAACP
president and the appointment of LeRoy Clark. Reverend Bell proclaimed that “the
suspension represents ‘a shameful retreat’ because ‘no meaningful discussion’ has taken
place with the board of education or the hospital.” 66 The decision to halt school boycotts
split the leadership of the Black Coalition. The split was caused by the debate over the
use of students in the hospital strike. Bell and other members of the Black Coalition did
not want to end the Black Monday protests until all of the demands to the school board
were met and the strike settled at St. Joseph’s Hospital. The NAACP continued voicing
their support of demonstrations and a boycott of downtown merchants until the hospital
strike could be resolved but ended their call for a school boycott.
On November 16, the board voted to implement the proposals suggested by the
mediation committee. Those suggestions involved the inclusion of African Americans on
the board including two interim black advisors, the appointment of a black assistant
superintendent and black coordinator, and a promise to intensify the recruitment of
quality black teachers. 67 Although the NAACP asked that students return to school, the
Black Coalition continued to encourage their participation in the protest against St.
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Joseph’s Hospital. The Black Coalition would not call an end to the boycott until the
board filed a ten million dollar lawsuit against coalition leaders on November 21. At this
point, the NAACP officially called an end to the Black Monday protest just as the ten-day
moratorium was coming to an end. They had accomplished several of their goals
including black representation on the school board, which would come to full realization
a little over two years later.
By the beginning of 1970, the Northcross case was back in the courts. Both the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court had remanded the case to the district courts. The
major question of this round of hearings centered on whether or not the Memphis school
system was maintaining a unitary system. The question of what defined a unitary system
and whether that meant massive integration had plagued the Court since Green. In
Alexander v. Holmes, the Supreme Court ruled that “if a school system’s plan of
desegregation effectively excludes any person from a school because of race or color, the
system was not unitary.” 68 Looking at the statistics, McRae ruled that the board was not
maintaining a unitary system. In the 1969-1970 school year, Memphis had 133,350
pupils composed of 45.6 percent black students and 54.4 percent white students in 166
schools in which 54 were all black, 18 all white, 25 predominately black, and 68
predominately white. 69 The next school year was expected to see a huge jump in
enrollment due to the annexation of additional Shelby county land. These new students
would swing the racial majority of the system to black students. 70 Because of segregated
housing patterns in the city, the court found that the use of zoning could only have a
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limited effectiveness in integrating schools. To counteract this, a transfer policy was put
in place to encourage transfers from majority to minority schools. Also, transfers from
majority to majority and minority to minority were allowed. The ruling did not address
faculty desegregation though it did note that as the board was implementing the courtordered twenty percent ratio, Superintendent E.C. Stimbert had publicly encouraged
teachers to resist their transfer plan.71 As was the pattern, the NAACP and the board
appealed the ruling.
On the same day that McRae issued his ruling, the Supreme Court issued their
rulings in five school cases. Among these were Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education and Davis v. The Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County. These
were some of the most monumental school decisions since Brown. Swann affirmed that
busing could be used as a tool for school desegregation, and the Davis decision
reaffirmed this decree. Wilkinson argues that “on the surface Swann was a great liberal
victory, perhaps the greatest since Brown.” 72 Like Brown, it did not give guidelines for
implementation and offered some comfort to conservatives opposed to busing. The Court
had placed limits on the extent that busing could be used. The Court declared that “not
every school need ‘reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole’; the
presence ‘of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a
district’ was not per se forbidden” and time and distance especially for younger students
being bused should be limited. 73 Wilkinson stresses that the Court ignored addressing
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the monumental issue of segregated housing in this decision. 74 Segregated housing
practices had been used nationally to create segregated schools. As monumental as it
was, the decision barely scratched the surface of what it could have done because it
avoided the housing question that would have made school desegregation a national issue
instead of a primarily southern issue. These decisions caused the court of appeals to
remand the Northcross case back to the district courts and set off a wave of public protest
against busing in Memphis.
As suggested by the court of appeals, McRae called in a team of educators from
the Division of Equal Opportunities of the United States Office of Education. This
seven-person team was charged with helping the board and the court formulate a plan for
desegregation that would work in Memphis. Starting on November 15, 1971, the court
began a new hearing that was to give guidelines to the team of educators on what the
situation in Memphis was, the history of discrimination against African Americans in the
city, and the legal precedent set by the Supreme Court in its recent decisions. Before the
team could begin work, Washington officials halted the team. President Richard Nixon
vehemently opposed busing and spoke out for a constitutional amendment opposing
busing as well as legislation that barred the use of federal funds to pay for busing. In an
editorial, the Tri-State Defender argued that “recent moves by HEW (Health, Education,
and Welfare) officials have indicated strongly the idea that the federal agency isn’t going
to aid segregation any more than necessary, which follows President Richard M. Nixon’s
stand to the letter.” 75 McRae explained that members of the team had been sent a letter
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from Washington setting forth restrictive guidelines for how they were to proceed with
developing their plans. 76 McRae relieved the team of their duty since “the guidelines
deprive Dr. Goldberg and the members of the Team from making objective
recommendations in the manner contemplated by the Director of the Title Four Program,
the members of the Team, the Board, and the Court” and ordered the board to prepare
two separate plans that were to be submitted to the court. 77 McRae noted that this was
the first time he had “any political interference directly from Washington” in his school
desegregation cases in west Tennessee. 78 In formulating a new plan, the court and both
parties involved faced opposition from all sides concerning the use of busing in
Memphis.
Opponents of busing had been making their feelings known since the Supreme
Court had issued its ruling in the Swann case. Memphis spawned a variety of anti-busing
organizations. Citizens Against Busing (CAB) became the most vocal of these
organizations. In February 1972, CAB along with other anti-busing organizations held a
97-car funeral procession for neighborhood schools. This demonstration was “part of a
nationwide ‘day of mourning’ for the inevitable death of neighborhood schools.” 79 The
white citizenry that compromised the majority of anti-busing groups argued that they did
not want their children bused into ghetto schools citing that they feared for the students’
safety. John Egerton, who was sent to Memphis by the Southern Regional Council to
observe and report on busing, argued that “CAB could claim the backing of virtually
every white politician in the city, and the support-in principle, at least – of state
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legislators, congressmen, Tennessee’s two U.S. senators and the President of the United
States.” 80 As the threat of busing grew, both CAB and city officials worked to keep
buses from rolling in Memphis.
Those supportive of busing saw it as the only way to achieve integration in areas
where residential communities were segregated. In a statement of policy printed in the
Commercial Appeal, citizens supportive of busing, many of them members of the
NAACP, responded to some of the statements made by those opposed to busing. “Due to
our housing patterns, we cannot eliminate busing of students- black and white- as one
approach to the solution of our school problems,” the group argued. 81 Unless the country
agreed to address past discrimination in housing practices, busing was the only solution
to integrating city school systems. Gary Orfield argues that two alternatives were
possible to promote residential integration though neither was supported by national
policy. He contends that “either a major effort must be made to open up housing choices
for blacks and integrate suburban housing or policies must be designed that will attract
jobs and white middle class residents back to the urban core in substantial numbers.” 82
Because of the wave of white suburbanization not only in Memphis but also across the
nation, busing provided the most obvious method to achieve school integration.
On March 3, 1972, two plans, written by assigned staff personnel from the board,
were presented before the court. These plans were designated Plan A, which called for
minimal busing and maximum pairing of schools, and Plan B, which called for necessary
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busing with no less than a thirty percent minority base per school. 83 The NAACP also
submitted a plan, and the board submitted three others. The court ignored the three plans
submitted by the board because they were seen as propaganda for continued segregation
and emphasized the board’s position against busing. The plan submitted by the NAACP
suggested the busing of approximately 61,000 students, which was about twice that
recommended in Plan B. 84 On April 20, McRae announced his decision which aimed for
a middle ground and approved Plan A that was to be implemented by the 1972-73 school
year. The polar opposite positions of the NAACP and the board, as well as the white
community’s opposition, prompted McRae to decide on a plan that would ease the city
into busing. He wrote in his decision that “the practicalities of the existing situation in
the city of Memphis limit the change in the plan of desegregation to this extent at the
present time” but that Plan A “might be used as a step toward further desegregation in the
future.” 85 The board appealed the ruling, but Plan A was upheld by the court of appeals.
Busing would soon become a reality. This would be the first time that school buses ever
rolled down the streets of Memphis.
On March 22, members of CAB held a protest rally prior to Judge McRae’s ruling
on a busing plan. During the protest, they buried a school bus to demonstrate their
opposition to busing. Immediately after Judge McRae issued his ruling on Plan A, antibusing protests intensified, and those opposed began searching for a way to overturn the
ruling. Mayor Wyeth Chandler initiated a plan to obtain a City Charter amendment that
would prohibit the use of tax funds to pay for school busing. The Commercial Appeal
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noted that such a move “would have doubtful legality.” 86 Speaking to a crowd of over
1,500 at Hillcrest High School, Mayor Chandler admitted that the only way that busing
could be prevented legally was through a constitutional amendment. 87 This was just one
of many mass meetings held by anti-busing forces planning their next course of action.
Four days later at a CAB meeting held at East High School, Ken Keele, CAB chairman,
called for a boycott of city schools for two days. Mayor Chandler addressed the
overflowing crowd urging parents and all citizens opposed to busing to unite and “stand
together now.” 88 CAB’s call for the boycott was heavily criticized by the majority of the
school board and the Memphis Area Chamber of Commerce, yet the mayor spoke out in
support saying he was “100 per cent behind their (CAB) efforts to fight this busing” and
that if boycotting would stop busing “the loss of two days to a child’s education would be
insignificant.” 89
As Memphians divided over this issue, the Commercial Appeal warned antibusing groups to consider how their actions would affect their children and the
community at large. Citing incidents in Nashville and Pontiac, Michigan, as prime
examples of the futility and danger of such protests, the editorial argued that protests and
boycotts had “increased racial conflicts, interrupted education, and set outrageous
examples for children who should have learned that this is a country ruled by law, not by
defiance of the law.” 90 The boycotts proceeded as planned however. A total of 52,717
students were reported absent and pickets were set up at 25 schools on the first day of the
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boycott. 91 The next day saw an increase of 4,123 more students absent from school. The
success of the boycott in disrupting city schools showed the widespread opposition to
Plan A. Opposition would take a potentially more violent tone the next week as bomb
threats were called into four predominately black high schools.
The NAACP responded to the boycotts by pointing out that several of their
members and supporters had been arrested for their role in the Black Monday protests
and were still facing charges on those arrests. Speaking before the Community Relations
Committee, Walter Evans, a black attorney and member of both the NAACP and the
committee, urged the committee to pursue legal action against CAB because of actions
taken against blacks during school boycotts. 92 The committee agreed that such a move
would be made if CAB continued their boycotts. The NAACP complaints about uneven
enforcement of the law were answered when on June 30, 1972, the charges stemming
from Black Monday were dropped. Maxine Smith noted in her annual report that
“ironically the District Attorney General did not dismiss these charges until a boycott of
schools was sponsored by a white group, none of whose leaders were arrested or charged
with any offense.” 93
The appeal process of the Northcross case delayed implementation of Plan A. On
June 2, 1972, the court of appeals granted a stay on Judge McRae’s decision. On August
29, the day after school started for the 1972-1973 school year, the court of appeals
dissolved the stay and reaffirmed Plan A with an implementation date of November 17,
1972. This date was pushed back to January 22, 1973, in a special hearing held in
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September. The appeal process was exhausted finally on October 6, 1972, when the
Supreme Court refused to delay the busing plan. The date was set for busing to
commence despite the best efforts of CAB, city officials, and the school board. The
school board conceded defeat on Plan A and voted to spend $252,000 to begin busing. 94
The Memphis Chamber of Commerce began working to help ease Memphians
into compliance of Plan A. In October, chamber officials led in the formation of
IMPACT—Involved Memphis Parents Assisting Children and Teachers. IMPACT
developed a program that hoped to gain community acceptance of busing through
“newspaper and television advertisements, fact sheets, a telephone rumor control system,
neighborhood meetings, a speaker’s bureau, church and organizational support, research
and troubleshooting.” 95 The organization adopted one simple line of defense:
“maintenance of public education as a viable institution, and maintenance of law and
order.” 96 They adopted the slogan “IMPACT—not the pros, not the cons, just the
facts.” 97 This slogan exemplified the stance of many involved with the organization.
They did not support busing necessarily, but they had accepted the court’s ruling and
understood that unless the Memphis community learned to accept Plan A, public
education in the city would suffer the consequences.
As the date for implementation drew closer, tensions mounted in the city. A week
before busing was to begin, the police arrested Robert Lawrence Payne, a 25-year-old
white man, who was accused of attempting to hire himself out to stop the buses from
rolling. Ken Keele had tipped off the police after Payne had offered his services to CAB.
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Keele assured the community after Payne’s arrest that “we have not advocated violence
or even scheduled demonstrations or picketing. The only way to stop busing is not to
have children on the buses.” 98 Keele, like other Memphians, opposed busing but did not
want to see violence used to stop the buses. Because CAB had run out of legal means to
halt busing, they began setting up private schools throughout the white neighborhoods of
the city and called for a total boycott of the schools.
On January 22, 1973, the buses rolled down the streets of Memphis for the first
time. Plan A affected 45 of the city’s 160 schools; almost all of those affected were
elementary schools. A total of 25,000 students had been reassigned with 12,000 of those
eligible for bus transportation. Of the 12,000 students to be bused, 7,000 were black
students. Violence did not erupt that day though some white parents did picket at a few
of the schools and several bomb threats were reported. 99 Egerton reported that 40,000
students were absent on the first day of busing. 100 Absenteeism declined slightly each
day as parents began sending their children back to the city schools. Many of those
absent would never return as they fled to private schools and newly formed CAB schools.
Approximately 6,000 students left the public schools system after the implementation of
Plan A. 101 A month after Plan A began, CAB claimed that they were operating 28
schools with an enrollment of 8,000 students. 102 Those newly formed schools were not
yet accredited.
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While the city had been coping with the implementation of Plan A, Judge McRae
and the attorneys for the NAACP and the school board had begun working on the final
phase of desegregation. On November 15, 1972, Judge McRae announced his final
instructions on how the parties were to proceed in developing a plan that finally would
make Memphis city schools a unitary system by eliminating the large number of one-race
schools. The final plan for school desegregation was reached on May 3, 1973. Judge
McRae concluded his decision by asserting that “having started with Plan A as the first
truly significant, involuntary means of desegregation in this city the Court hereby
designates the combined approved plans as Plan Z in hope that it would prove to be the
terminal plan for this long standing problem in the City of Memphis.” 103 Plan Z called
for the busing of 39,904 students beginning in the 1973-1974 school year. 104 The school
districts were divided into satellite zones in which students from the predominately white
eastern side of the city would be bused to the predominately black western side of the city
and vice versa.
Plan Z did not eliminate all one-race schools. Judge McRae had selected the least
extensive busing plan placed before him. In fact, the new plan left 22 schools virtually
all black with an enrollment of 22,000 students, which was 30 percent of the black
enrollment. 105 Judge McRae had rejected the NAACP’s plan which would have bused
over 57,000 students citing “‘limiting factors’ of cost, busing times, preserving
desegregation already accomplished, and achieving an effective plan.” 106 Judge McRae
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acknowledged that white flight placed limitations on how expansive the school
desegregation plan could be. In the implementation of Plan A, white parents had shown
their refusal to send their children to certain previously all-black schools. Judge McRae
argued in his opinion that “the fact remains that a system cannot effectively desegregate
by the practice of involuntarily assigning members of the opposite race to certain schools
if there are insufficient members of the white race available to assign.” 107 Busing
remained a volatile issue, and few doubted that more white students would leave the city
schools as a result of Plan Z. Judge McRae had sought a plan that would eliminate many
of the one-race schools without inflaming any more of the white citizenry than necessary.
As the school board began planning on how it would implement Plan Z, Mayor
Wyeth Chandler and the City Council began devising allegedly legal tactics to keep the
buses from rolling in the fall of 1973. These tactics primarily consisted of withholding
gasoline and funds to pay for busing from the school board. Mayor Chandler had been
successful in amending the city’s Charter and passing a city ordinance that “made it
unlawful for the City Council to levy taxes for providing funds for the board of education
to transport students for the purpose of achieving a racial balance.” 108 Neither the
amendment to the city’s Charter nor the city ordinance would stand up in court because
both the district court and the court of appeals had noted that the Memphis desegregation
plan was not designed to achieve racial balance. Mayor Chandler then turned to state law
to stop the buses. In June 1973, Chandler announced that the city would no longer
furnish gasoline for busing “because of a state law forbidding the sale of tax-exempt
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gasoline to private firms.” 109 The board had contracted with School Transportation Inc.
of Kansas City, Missouri to provide the necessary school buses for the court-ordered
plans. The board responded by changing the wording of their contract with the Kansas
City company to read that “the school system is leasing the buses.” 110 By leasing the
buses, the school system would not have to pay the state tax on the gasoline.
The legality of obstructionist tactics did not stop the mayor from working to
withhold gas supplies from the board prior to the implementation of Plan Z. On June 17,
1973, Maynard Stiles, a city department head who handled the gasoline contracts, wrote a
letter to the board warning that “he would be unable to provide gasoline for buses for the
operations to begin in September 1973.” 111 The board had been expecting the city to
withhold gasoline supplies. Three days prior to receiving the letter, they had sent out
invitations to bid to nineteen suppliers but got no bids. The national fuel crisis prevented
most suppliers from taking on more contracts. The board took their problem to Judge
McRae who issued a Memorandum Decision on July 26, 1973. The decision directed
“the mayor, the city, and the board, including all subordinate top officials to make good
faith efforts by all available means to obtain the gasoline necessary for implementation
and continued operation of Plan Z.” 112 The city was directed further to remove
limitations on the amount of gasoline the board could purchase and to work with Exxon
who held the city contract to obtain additional supplies in light of their suspension of
allocations during July and August. The board was instructed to request only the
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minimal amount necessary for Plan Z, to begin efforts to find additional storage facilities,
and to find its own source of gasoline as soon as possible.
On August 15 less than two weeks before the beginning of the school year, Mayor
Chandler issued a statement that “the city had failed in its ‘good faith effort’ to obtain
fuel for Plan Z school busing.” 113 Exxon officials reportedly would not guarantee the
city more than the five million gallons they had contracted for originally. The mayor
argued that because Exxon would not guarantee additional supplies, this endangered a
variety of departments such as the police, ambulance, and fire squads of running out of
fuel before the end of the contract. Chandler argued that “whatever additional they sold
us now might be taken off the end of the contract, and then we may run out.” 114 The
mayor suggested that Plan Z be delayed because of the gasoline shortage. The board
opposed a delay citing that such a move would be “an administrative catastrophe.” 115
As the start of the school year grew near, Judge McRae called for an evidentiary
hearing on August 29 that would determine whether the city could supply the gasoline
needed. Before that hearing, the NAACP added Exxon and the Secretary of Interior to
the defendant list. Exxon and the Secretary of Interior were accused of conspiring with
the mayor and city officials “to deprive the black students of their constitutional rights by
not providing gasoline for the Court ordered Plan Z.” 116 An agreement was reached prior
to the hearing set for August 29 that made the hearing unnecessary. Exxon agreed to
make available the quantity of gasoline requested by the city and not to deduct that
amount from the existing five million gallon contract. The city agreed to order the
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gasoline as requested by the board. 117 With the gasoline crisis resolved, Plan Z was
ready to begin.
On August 27, 1973, Memphis embarked on what would be the last phase of
school desegregation. For the first time, busing in Memphis would affect high schools.
The Commercial Appeal reported that there was little of the community tension that had
developed prior to the implementation of Plan A. 118 Plagued with lateness and missed
stops, the buses rolled peacefully down the city streets though with fewer students.
Instead of pickets and demonstrations, those opposed to busing simply fled the public city
schools. Many of them chose to enroll their children at one of the eighty-five private
schools in the city. Over 20,000 white students left the Memphis city school system
because of Plan Z. 119
White flight as much as busing reshaped Memphis city schools. It served as the
last option for those opposed to busing and desegregation. Seeing that they no longer had
any hope of keeping public schools segregated, those opposed to desegregation simply
left the public school system. Parents tired of boycotts, legal decisions, and controversy
affecting their children’s education also withdrew their children from the city schools. In
a three-year period between 1970 and 1973, approximately 37,000 students left the public
school system. 120 “The root cause of white flight was the white racism syndrome which
had become heavily infested in the Caucasian portion of the Memphis and Shelby County
community,” McRae argues. 121 The Commercial Appeal cited “a fear of declining
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quality of education” as another reason for the high numbers of white students fleeing the
public schools. 122 The declining quality of education defense, however, was often based
on racist perceptions of the alleged low academic abilities of African American students.
Whatever their reasons, a large number of white students left the public city schools
leaving the system with a racial makeup of 71 percent black students and 29 percent
white students. 123 White flight caused such a reduction in student enrollment that Plan Z
had to be modified. In his oral history, Judge McRae noted that white flight did have
some advantages. The main advantage was the removal of potential problems “brought
about by mixing black students with some white students who came from white racist
homes.” 124 It also cut costs pertaining to facilities, personnel, and transportation.
The appeals process for Plan Z did not conclude until April 23, 1974. The
NAACP had appealed that the Northcross case be sent back to Judge McRae for further
review because of the large number of one-race schools left in the city school system.
The Supreme Court refused to review the case. That refusal coincided with the Court’s
departure from strongly supporting school desegregation. As the fight to desegregate
American schools reached the North, the Supreme Court gave in to both public and
political pressure and began limiting Brown’s reach. 125 The New York Times reported
that “the Justices’ refusal to consider the Memphis case appeared to civil rights lawyers
to signal an emerging trend toward not requiring full implementation of desegregation in
the South, increasing the likelihood that future compromise plans from other cities would
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prove acceptable to the court.” 126 Regardless of the Court’s motives, both the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court upheld Plan Z. Busing, though strongly opposed by
many Memphians, served as the tool capable of integrating schools. After over thirteen
years of litigation, Memphis had finally arrived at a unitary school system in the eyes of
the court.
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Conclusion
School desegregation in Memphis occurred in three of the four phases argued by
Wilkinson: absolute defiance, token desegregation, and massive integration. During the
period of absolute defiance, city officials used action and rhetoric to demonstrate their
resistance to Brown while maintaining their opposition to the use of violence to prevent
desegregation. The period of token desegregation began with the filing of the Northcross
case. As the NAACP began pushing for desegregation, the board resigned themselves to
fighting desegregation in the courts. By 1968, the Supreme Court began issuing rulings
that set a more definite course for school desegregation. These new rulings along with
Judge Boyd’s retirement in 1966 marked the beginning of a new phase in the battle to
desegregate Memphis schools. Massive integration saw the completion of the evolution
of Brown’s meaning. Swann allowed busing to be used to combat the effects of
segregated housing patterns in urban areas and provided the solution that Memphis
needed in order to achieve a unitary school system. Memphis experienced a series of
crises but was able to weather them without mob violence taking over the city. During
this period, major strides were taken to end segregation in Memphis city schools. At the
same time, violence was avoided because of the commitment of the city’s leadership to
fight their battles in the courtroom and not in the streets of Memphis. Almost twenty
years after Brown, Memphis finally operated a unitary school system. It had been a long
fight that left lasting marks on the city and forever changed the public school system.
Ten years after the implementation of Plan Z, busing remained a controversial
issue in Memphis. White flight continued after the implementation of Plan Z in 1973 and
into the 1980s, though at a reduced rate. In 1982, the board and the NAACP reached a
49

consent agreement that modified Plan Z according to the shifting patterns of the system.
The agreement reduced “busing in parts of the city, produced 23 neighborhood schools,
closed 3 cost-ineffective schools, decreased transportation costs by $1 million without
decreasing desegregation in the system.” 127 Despite a reduction in busing, Memphians
were still divided sharply on the issue. Those still opposed claimed that busing had been
“a costly disaster” that had done “major damage to the school system and the city.” 128
Supporters argued that busing had wrought a “major improvement in attitudes and that
school desegregation provided a basis for major racial progress.” 129
On November 11, 1992, the Northcross case was placed on inactive status. Judge
McRae noted that “nineteen years had passed since Plan Z had been approved and for ten
years the parties had settled and agreed upon changes and interpretations of the revised
Plan.” 130 The Northcross case was dismissed finally on April 23, 1999. As of 2004,
3,300 students were still being bused “on routes born under desegregation.” 131
As we look back fifty years after the original decision, many ask whether Brown
and the subsequent decisions of the Court were truly successful in desegregating schools.
White flight into suburbia and private schools counteracted many of the measures taken
to desegregate public schools. Scholars such as Gary Orfield have questioned the Court’s
commitment to Brown’s principles. The conservative political backlash from busing has
reversed many of the gains made prior to 1974. Any successes that were made have
since been reversed or are in danger of being reversed. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court
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moved further away from the principles of Brown issuing decisions that “established
legal standards to determine when a local school district had repaid what the Court
defined as a historic debt to its black students.” 132 Once a system has been ruled unitary,
it is free to revert back to neighborhood schools even if those schools are segregated.
The reality of resegregation must be taken into account in the debate over the success of
Brown.
In Memphis, the debate is split according to how one defines the objectives of
Brown. In reflecting on the Northcross case, Judge McRae argued that desegregation did
work because the goal was never to achieve racial balance. 133 He maintained that “the
goal was to order the board to adopt a plan that would rid the system of separate racial
systems under one board and have the board put in place a desegregation plan consistent
with Supreme Court decisions.” 134 According to McRae’s argument, Memphis was
successful in desegregating its public school system.
Many do not agree with Judge McRae’s assessment. In 2004, Memphis city
schools consisted of 101,232 black students (88 percent) and 9,239 white students (8
percent). 135 The city is 62 percent black and 35 percent white. Half of the city schools
are composed of virtually all African-American students. In an interview reflecting on
Brown and how it affected the city, Mayor Willie Herenton argued that “if you look at the
schools today, they are more racially isolated than they were in the early days of
integration.” 136 A recent study by The Civil Rights Project at Harvard examined the forty
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largest school districts in the nation. Memphis ranked number one for the most
segregated private schools. 137 Deborah Northcross, for whom the Memphis suit was
styled, remarked after speaking before an assembly at Central High School in 2004 that
“I could count the number of white students in the audience on both of my hands. It’s
like we’re just doing a slow walk back to the way it was.” 138
The debate over the success or failure of Brown continues into the twenty-first
century. Are we slowly walking back to the way things were or have we stayed true to
the principles of Brown? The Memphis story of school desegregation highlights both the
limited successes and failures of Brown. The Northcross case succeeded in dismantling
the segregating school system. Opposition to busing, however, caused thousands of
students to flee the city schools and created an African-American school system. In
Memphis, Brown failed to create an integrated school system that could provide students
with an ethnically diverse educational experience.
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